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Abstract
Our essay epitomizes systems thinking not only to identify possible unintended consequences of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), but also to offer suggestions mitigating their 
impact. Employing two-loop, generic system archetypes, our intent is to help stakeholders in 
intellectual property (IP) understand some of the nuances influencing the patent lifecycle linked 
to AIA. Building on the lingua franca used in patent law, our essay highlights four important 
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changes: being the first-to-file for protection; eliminating best mode disclosure; expanding the 
definition of prior art; and expanding post-grant review.  Armed with a better understanding of 
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the system issues imbedded in the legislation, innovators and entrepreneurs can develop 
strategies to deal with the attendant issues. For example, the tragedy of the commons associated 
with first-to-file highlights the need to increase R&D resources; else, over time incremental 
innovation will inevitably dominate efforts to modify the patent portfolio.  Overall, AIA 
represents a step forward in harmonizing the US with the rest of the world while it increases the 
transparency of the legal maze that remains patent law; however, the changes bring allocation 
issues, secrecy, and time pressure to the forefront of the conversation about new product 
development.  Recognition of these impacts is relevant worldwide for anyone contemplating a 
US patent or any entity attempting to maintain a viable portfolio of intellectual property. 
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Thriving in a New Patent World 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used 
when we created them.  Einstein 
 
 
Our experience with patents goes back decades.  Years ago, we wondered why our 
product designs were always constrained by certain manufacturing processes:  the word 
circulated within the enterprise that someone in engineering held a patent that forced everyone to 
stay within a specified “box,” no matter the attempt at innovation. Years later, while advising the 
entrepreneur heading a biotech start-up, we had to advocate for changing the patent attorney of 
record because it became apparent that the lack of expertise in the technology hindered the 
prosecution of the patent that became the foundation of the enterprise: thousands of precious 
investment dollars fell by the wayside. 
 
Over the last two decades, many have noted the need for innovators and entrepreneurs to 
develop a more nuanced view of issues related to intellectual property (IP) (Crawford, 2012; 
Drucker, 1998; Grandstrand & Oskarsson, 1994).  Too many fail to seek patent protection for 
innovations, and they publicly disclose new inventions before filing a patent application: 
resulting in a waiver of their patent rights (noted by R.J. Genet in Crawford, 2012).   For 
engineers, in particular, the need for increased mindfulness is acute (Laney, 2001, p. 4): 
 
…every schematic, each piece of software code, and every drawing, diagram, and 
prototype has intellectual property rights attached upon creation... These rights are the 
legal essence of an engineer's output, for if an actual disk or prototype is lost, another 
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can always be had. But if the legal rights are lost, the disk or prototype may be worthless 
— even if securely in hand… Employers guard the economic value created by the 
engineering process as carefully as the output of the manufacturing process itself… 
 
Lin, Chen and Wu (2006, p. 17) recognize the overall challenge: 
 
 
The most challenging task of managers in the current knowledge-based economy is to 
exploit the full value of corporate intellectual properties and to effectively accumulate 
and commercialize knowledge assets.  This challenge is not new for technology managers 
since their primary job is to manage corporate technological assets and to develop new 
technological capabilities. 
 
 
 
In the US since 2011, this concern is paramount because of the promulgation of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), US policymakers’ attempt to improve the patent 
lifecycle at the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  AIA foc ses on harmonizing with 
other national, patent systems, on improving efficiency, and on increasing transparency: 
changing to first to file; eliminating best mode disclosure; expanding prior art; and adding post- 
grant review, among others (Francis, 2012). 
Unfortunately, AIA arrives with the same concern surrounding the creation of any new law 
because lawmakers may be unaware of, or knowingly screen out complex issues that could affect 
the outcomes of the laws they are creating (LoPucki, 1997). Gaining insight into the situation 
requires interdisciplinary learning: specifically, perspective taking, and thinking more 
comprehensively (Mathews and Jones, 2008).  Perspective taking in interdisciplinary 
understanding involves examining a problem from the standpoint of interested disciplines...and 
identifying the differences (Repko, 2008), and it is essential to understanding how various 
stakeholders interrelate.  Thinking more comprehensively incorporates not only how stakeholders 
identify a problem, but also important causal factors contributing to the problem, as well as the 
relationships among those factors.   
This inherent complexity and likely spate of unintended consequences begs for systems 
thinking to uncover inherent problems and suggest solutions.  This need is especially acute when 
law is involved since the structure is massive and few know it well enough to intuit leverage points  
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(Billingham, 2013).  Adopting systems thinking facilitates a shift in perspective from law as a 
conceptual system to law as an element of concrete, empirically-verifiable "law-related" systems… 
[and]…has the potential to put legal scholarship in touch with reality (LoPucki, 1997).   
Our essay aims to help innovators and entrepreneurs understand some of the nuances of 
these dramatic changes to the patent lifecycle.  This mindfulness begins with exposure to the 
lingua franca used in patent law.  In addition, this essay exemplifies systems thinking, employing 
two-loop, generic archetypes, to highlight techniques and processes to mitigate possible 
unintended consequences arising from AIA’s implementation.  Armed with a better 
understanding of the systems issues imbedded in the changes, IP stakeholders, regardless of 
discipline or managerial role, will be prepared to make significant contributions to their 
organization’s goal of maintaining a viable IP portfolio.
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Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
 
 
Change is the way of life.  John F. Kennedy 
 
 
 
 
AIA changes the IP landscape.  It signals the need for a major shift in strategic thinking 
not only about protecting intellectual property, but also about constraints on new product 
development.  Lerner, Speen and Leamon (2015) emphasize both the act’s complexity, and its 
ambiguity; they raise concerns about the consequences of the reforms.  The uncertainty 
surrounding the implementation of AIA behooves innovators and entrepreneurs around the world 
to become familiar with its critical aspects. 
 
Under AIA, worldwide harmony is built around the granting of a patent to whoever files 
first, not the first to invent.  Subject to the payment of fees, patents are typically granted for a 
term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the priority date 
for the patent (Patents, 2013).  Disregarding nuances, the median time between application and 
issue (defined as patent pendency; Troyer, 2016) continues to decrease, remaining around 3 
years; although the range between shortest and longest pendency in 2014 was over a decade 
(Crawford, 2012).  Gaging patent pendency remains complex given that patent examination may 
be deferred; in the US, a patent applicant may request up to a three-year delay (Suspension, 
2018).  Successfully navigating pendency forces both innovator and entrepreneur to make honest 
judgements about the value of an innovation, per se, as well as its contribution overall to the 
technology portfolio of an enterprise.   Finally, another type of harmony is guaranteed. 
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Submarine patents (intentionally delaying publication of a patent in order to sue others who may 
use it in the future) are no longer possible because a patent becomes public knowledge long 
before it is granted or abandoned: patent applications in the US are published automatically after 
18 months (Neustel, 2013). 
 
 
AIA’s elimination of the need to disclose the best mode for the innovation also helps 
harmonize the US with the rest of the world.  Before AIA, US patent applications had to disclose 
the best mode or risk invalidation.  The intent was to ensure that competitors could compete 
fairly following expiration of a patent by prohibiting the patent owner from withholding crucial 
details about the most valuable commercial form of the invention (Petherbridge & Rantanen, 
2012).  After AIA, the requirement, while technically still present, is effectively unenforceable 
 
(Auvil, 2011). 
 
 
AIA expands the definition of prior art to include both foreign sales and public uses. 
With few exceptions, any prior disclosure of an invention is prior art and invalidates 
patentability (Villasenor, 2012).  In addition, the actions of third parties unrelated to the inventor 
can invalidate patentability if they share publicly the particulars of a technology and undermine 
its claim to novelty.  The expanded definition remains ambiguous: what is included in terms of 
specific protections in the year-long grace period provided for inventors to file after a disclosure 
without endangering a claim of novelty for their invention remains unclear.  AIA may, in some 
cases, limit the reach of prior art. 
 
The added transparency embodied in AIA seeks to avoid litigation over patents.  Post 
grant review (PGR) is now an integral part of the patent prosecution process. Sometimes the 
process can favor someone opposing an existing patent, while at other times the process can 
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favor a patent holder.  Regarding the former, an opposing party has nine months in which to ask 
USPTO to review a patent’s validity on any of the usual grounds of patentable subject matter: 
novelty, utility, obviousness, or failure to provide an adequate written description (enablement). 
PGR requires only the lower preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the higher clear 
and convincing evidence standard required in court (Lu, Uthaman, & Kowalski, 2012).  Also, 
patent validity is not assumed under PGR as it is in court.   Favoring a patent holder, the notion 
of deceptive intent is eliminated; Noonan (2013) notes that an applicant is no longer bound by a 
“duty of candor” during the prosecution of a patent.  Defending against infringement claims is 
less costly since administrative evaluation is encouraged outside of district court (Lin, Chen, & 
Wu, 2006). 
 
 
Systems Thinking about AIA 
 
 
Everything must be made as simple as possible…But not simpler. 
Einstein 
 
 
 
 
Given this quick overview of the key changes with AIA, a systems thinker (Meadows, 
 
2008) recognizes not only that the quest for harmony, efficiency, and transparency is laudable, 
but also that the connections among AIA, innovators and entrepreneurs produces a characteristic 
set of behaviors: some pleasant; some, not.  A systems thinker searches for cause and effect 
relationships among the system elements; observes how elements form a pattern; recognizes how 
attendant connections generate both intended consequences (outcomes) and unintended 
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 consequences.  A systems thinker aims to make organizational boundaries transparent to help 
stakeholders communicate better (Wolstenholme, 2003) by highlighting the impact of 
contemplated changes. 
 
Better communication about the implementation of AIA begins by recognizing 
underestimated dangers.  Tenner’s (1996) framework identifies five generic types of dangers, 
manifested as unintended consequences.  Recomplicating consequences happen when a new law 
makes the environs more complex: everyone involved needs not only vigilance to prevent the 
situation from becoming overwhelming, but also sophisticated craftsmanship to function in the 
new atmosphere. Recongesting consequences occur when new laws appear to open unlimited 
vistas but actually clog the byway with competition (as happened with demand for media 
broadcasting bandwidth): more venues must be opened; more help must be found; and 
streamlining or compression algorithms must be implemented; else, delay becomes the new 
watchword for the system. Repeating consequences happen when new laws funnel everyone into 
focusing on the same task, over and over:  processes and procedures must be put in place to 
allocate time for important tasks that otherwise will be neglected in the incessant repetition. 
Rearranging consequences take place when new laws change the focus from one set of tasks to 
another, to the detriment of the health of the overall system: modified processes and procedures 
allocate time to avoid neglecting important tasks. Regenerating consequences result when new 
laws cause new problems: new solutions must be implemented, but not necessarily new law 
(Tenner, 1996). 
 
Systems thinkers facilitate better communication by employing diagrams that emphasize 
either causal loops or stocks and flows.  Causal loop diagrams enable stakeholders to visualize 
system complexity, and gain insight into how the disciplinary parts of the problem relate to  
Ac
ce
p e
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Thriving in a New Patent World  
8 
 
 
each other and to the problem as a whole (Repko, 2008).  Once stakeholders understand the 
dynamics of the system, they can identify and test hypotheses about where and when to 
intervene in the system, as well as propose ways to mitigate potential problems. Thus at the 
outset of the conversation about how to define and structure an issue, causal loop diagrams take 
center stage; later, when precise quantification of all the system’s parts and their interrelation is 
key, stock-flow diagrams dominate the conversation: especially if the goal is to simulate the 
behavior of a system over time.  Toward the end of the conversation, causal loops again reign, 
with a focus on synthesizing insights instead of details.   Always, the choice between loops and 
stocks is a compromise between simplicity for communication and completeness for validity 
(Wolstenholme, 2003). 
 
Since one major goal of this essay is to show ways to mitigate possible unintended 
consequences arising from AIA’s implementation, causal loop diagrams, their generic, system 
archetypes, and their generic solutions define the bounds of the essay. Thinking about the 
permutations of a balancing loop and a reinforcing loop defines the minimum number, four, of 
generic system archetypes possible: underachievement; relative control; relative achievement; 
and out of control (Table 1; Wolstenholme, 2003). Table 2 shows the connection between these 
two-loop systems and the classic set of archetypes differentiated by either growth or fixing 
problems (Braun, 2002):  note the linkages between the two sets.  As we will demonstrate, these 
linkages offer decision makers a robust toolkit for communicating the intended and unintended 
consequences of a complex system, as well as highlighting means to mitigate undesirable 
outcomes. 
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INSERT Table 1.  Permutations of Balancing and Reinforcing Loops Define Four Generic 
 
System Archetypes and Solution Links (Adapted from Wolstenholme, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
Mitigating the Unintended Consequences of AIA 
 
 
See the whole; see interrelationships rather than things; see 
patterns not snapshots. Da Vinci 
 
 
 
 
Our essay now moves from general archetypes to their specific application related to AIA.   The 
goal is to help IP stakeholders structure, understand and predict the consequences associated with 
AIA.  Armed with this tool, the conversation also includes a solution link to mitigate the 
unintended, negative impacts.  Four key concerns dictate the tone of the conversation. Each 
assertion follows the simple model proposed by Einstein’s hypothesis describing the link between 
mass and space:  objects with mass cause space to bend.  Our first proposal is that, overall, the 
innovativeness of individual patents will decrease because of AIA.  Second, the desire to disclose 
best mode will decrease because of AIA.  Third, the climate of secrecy within and across 
enterprises and institutions will increase because of AIA.  Finally, the value proposition of a 
portfolio of technology-based ideas, goods, and services will become adulterated because of AIA. 
 
 
Specifically, we develop figures showing how specific combinations of two loop, generic systems 
and classic archetypes communicate the impact of key changes wrought by AIA.  Each figure has 
common elements:  some initial, intentional activity by decision maker (a top rectangle) results in 
both some intended consequence (a middle rectangle), as well as an unintended consequence (a 
bottom rectangle “outside” a system boundary).  Each figure also shows a possible ‘solution link’ 
(that includes either a balancing or a reinforcing loop, depending upon the archetype involved) that 
might mitigate the effects of the unintended consequences. Additionally, the right side of each 
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figure pays homage to system dynamics by showing a notional change in relevant activities over 
time, by plotting an appropriate normalized quantity versus time. 
 
 
 
 
First-to-File 
 
 
 
A systems thinker recognizes that the compulsion for worldwide harmony has risks. 
Consider the unintended consequences of first-to-file, the most widely discussed feature of AIA 
(Villasenor, 2012).  With AIA a patent is usually awarded to the first entity to file.  Before AIA, 
if a second party filed for a patent for the same invention, expensive, interference proceedings 
took place to identify the actual first inventor.  The search for “first” focused on proof of “first 
thought” and a working model of the invention, when applicable.  Still with AIA, Reiter, Baker, 
and Fasse (2012) note three exceptions where a second party to file may have rights to a patent. 
Generally, however, the principle is simpler now: the first application retains rights to a patent, 
regardless of the date of the invention. 
 
The most obvious unintended consequence of first-to- file is a race to the patent office. 
This recongesting consequence arises from a focus on provisional patents (if for no other reason 
than to help establish an early filing date): this in turn increases the likelihood of delays in the 
system (Susie, 2013). 
 
Less obvious, and more important, is a regenerating consequence:  speedy patenting 
activity leads to an improper balance in the product portfolio, with a trend away from platform 
and breakthrough innovations in favor of  incremental ones (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992).  Look 
at this possible outcome through the lens of the underachievement archetype (Wolstenholme, 
2003).  Figure 1 highlights this classic archetype, tragedy of the commons.  As with any two- 
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loop, generic archetype, an action (in this case the patenting activity of Enterprise A) generates 
an outcome (the intended consequence, an increase in patent awards), accompanied with a 
reinforcing loop (R) that encourages more patent filings. 
 
 
 
 
 
INSERT Figure 1.  Mitigating risk with First-to-File facilitated by an Underachievement 
 
Archetype 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, an unintended consequence accompanies the emphasis on more patent 
awards: damage to the product portfolio.   Typically, a delay (symbolized by broad dashes (=) 
interrupting the flow of the balancing loop (B)) exists between the original action and the 
system’s reaction.  Figure 1 also shows a solution link (denoted by a dotted line): in this 
exemplar, the solution entails an additional reinforcing loop (R) between the action and the 
resource constraint, the commons (available resources, such as personnel or the R&D budget). 
Notionally, without some type of reinforcing connection between patenting activity and product 
portfolio, the danger is that the commons will collapse from the unrealistic demands placed upon 
resources (Braun, 2002).  Here the appropriate reinforcing activity is additional monetary and 
personnel resources for the commons.  Simultaneously, patenting activity (at both Enterprise A 
and its competitors) would increase until a limit is reached in a more distant period. 
 
With little effort, applying Tenner’s (1996) typology uncovers other, unintended 
consequences of the change to first-to- file.  Consider the recomplicating consequence on the 
selection and compatibility of alliance partners.  McGill and Santoro (2009) conceptualize a 
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firm’s alliance partners as a portfolio related to patent output. Partners can be differentiated 
 
 
along two dimensions: nature of resources (knowledge versus property) and inter-organizational 
mode (transactional versus relational).  Firms with alliances characterized as either focus or 
hedge (emphasizing either knowledge and relations or property and transactions) have 
significantly higher patent output.  To the extent that alliance partners are motivated to pursue 
aggressive first-to-file strategies, less valuable patents dominate patent portfolios, with a focus on 
incremental innovation.  To the extent partners are committed to differing first-to-file strategies 
(filing frequently for only incremental changes versus less frequently but for major or 
breakthrough changes) numerous dysfunctions may arise between partners, including distrust, 
disharmony, secretiveness, eroding goals of commitment to the alliance, etc.  To help mitigate 
these possible outcomes, clear procedures and protocols need to be established in advance to 
clarify and ensure transparency about each partner’s intended filing strategy, as well as its 
objectives for the alliance’s patent portfolio. 
 
Collectively, these underestimated dangers of pursuing an aggressive first-to-file strategy 
highlight the need to develop new protocols, involving different stakeholders, to identify and 
evaluate patentable goods and services as early as possible.  Heines (2014) emphasizes that these 
new protocols must be …adapted to protect against or minimize any loss…under the first-to-file 
rule… 
 
Adopting a systems perspective with a environmental boundary that extends to society as 
a whole, highlights a danger that these new protocols may damage the overall innovation rate in 
the US.  For example, if larger enterprises file early and often, they could make it more difficult 
for smaller enterprises that lack a dedicated patent team to secure patents. Special, even new- 
genre, enterprises may emerge to patent everything and anything around new technologies; these  
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patent filings will deter an original thinker from developing an idea further because of the 
fear of unwarranted patent infringement claims. Innovators at smaller enterprises may have less 
motivation to support breakthrough innovation because decision makers siphon resources from 
their organization’s commons (R&D budgets, etc.) and redirect patent applications toward 
incremental innovations. This, in turn, could cause a smaller enterprise to miss strategic 
opportunities regarding its innovation portfolio and market development. The cascading impact 
results in fewer startups, slower job creation, lower gross domestic product, fewer exports, and 
so on:  all arguably undesirable consequences in the broader macro environment. 
 
 
 
Best Mode Disclosure 
 
 
The elimination of the need to disclose the best mode for the innovation hides 
underestimated dangers, as well, even though it helps harmonize the US with the rest of the 
world.  By using the analogy of a sponge, Petherbridge & Rantanen (2012) note how this missing 
requirement negatively influences the incentive structure of any patent system: 
 
…the best mode requirement helps define the legally required distance between bubbles 
of restricted information. Specifically, it encourages a greater distance between bubbles 
…to limit the patentability of modest incremental improvements…which may adversely 
impact the incentive structure…. The best mode requirement…cooperates with 
nonobviousness…to protect the public domain. 
 
 
 
 
 
Presumably, higher levels of nonobviousness in an innovation imply a stronger 
justification for granting a patent. Without the need to report the preferred embodiment of an 
innovation, incremental improvements are more likely to receive a patent. Thus, innovators will 
need to police patent applications themselves (with increased vigilance searching for less 
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obvious, but more important applications), else their budgets will be consumed by the pursuit 
patents with only marginal commercial utility or societal benefit after losing focus on valuable 
users. 
 
This is a recomplicating, unintended consequence, and the classic archetype of drifting 
standards characterizes it with two balancing loops (Figure 2).  The key risk uncovered by this 
relative control archetype relates to initiatives to disclose best mode. Best mode links to Target of 
“Best:” absolutely the ideal encapsulation of the most commercially viable approach embodying 
the technology discussed in the patent application.  Now, a disclosure of best mode may be other 
than this ideal encapsulation, reflecting only a convenient sharing of one of myriad possibilities. 
Original goals to provide an ideal, absolute encapsulation sink to lower levels (although the 
system experiences a delay before this occurs) unless a balancing dynamic is put into play to 
force a comparison with absolutes. 
 
 
 
 
 
INSERT Figure 2.  Mitigating risk with Best Mode facilitated by a Relative Control Archetype 
 
 
 
 
 
The notional, dynamic changes in this drifting system showcase two implications, unless 
decision makers implement a solution link.  First, the patent owner’s desire to disclose best mode 
diminishes over time.  The system reinforces avoiding disclosure (reinforced by legal issues, as 
well as the pressure of first-to-file). The second implication is the ebb and flow of any current 
practice aimed at disclosing the best mode in order to close the gap between what is actually 
shared and what ideally could be shared (the most commercially viable manifestation of the 
technology).   Some actions may improve actual practices in disclosing best mode, but only in 
the short-term due to the overall pressure to disclose early and expand the IP portfolio. 
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Without a third balancing loop and its solution link, the long-term impact is that goals are 
adjusted so they can be met (downward, lowering expectations and performance standards); 
better solutions aimed at meeting ambitious goals are lost in the process (Braun, 2002).  Without 
the need to report the preferred embodiment of an innovation, a recongesting, unintended 
consequence is possible: applications for patents, especially for marginal improvements, may 
clog new product development.  On the one hand, innovators who wish to disclose the best mode 
(perhaps to gain greater recognition for themselves, department, organization, or to enhance 
contributions to society) must police applications themselves to make such determinations; else, 
patents with only marginal commercial utility or societal benefit consume the budget. On the 
other hand, the change to the first-to-file puts pressure on innovators to file early, often before 
identifying best mode.  Collectively these possibilities highlight the need to develop new 
protocols to evaluate the commercial potential of goods and services as early as possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expansion of Prior Art 
 
 
As the compulsion for worldwide harmony comes with underestimated dangers, so does 
the drive for increased efficiency.   The wording in AIA of “private vs. public sales” is cause for 
concern for all IP stakeholders.  The wording is ambiguous about what is included in the grace 
period.  If, as some have stated…‘available to the public’ is read as ‘on sale’, then private sales 
and offer-for-sales may no longer be construed as prior art (Raich, 2011).  Thus, patent 
prosecutions may be more difficult, as examiners will have an expanded scope of art to challenge 
applications.  Still, start-ups, smaller enterprises, and individual inventors may benefit from the 
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prior art rules and the one-year grace period. A possible reverse revenge effect (Tenner, 1996) of 
AIA is that start-ups will benefit from a prior use right’s defense.  To clarify, if an invention is 
documented and placed into commercial use at least one year before the priority date, 
commercial use will in all likelihood constitute a defense against infringement (Raich, 2011). 
The expanded definition of prior art means that weighing the pros and cons of almost any 
disclosure is an absolute necessity: whether it is an offering of the invention for sale to the 
public, or a presentation about the invention by a graduate student (all of this concern leads to a 
 
recomplicating, unintended consequence). 
 
 
These changes with regard to prior art are embodied in the classic success to the 
successful archetype, a relative achievement generic, with the two reinforcing loops shown in 
Figure 3.  In this system, achievement comes at the expense of other stakeholders.  The 
unintended consequences of undermining the novelty claim disproportionately outweighs the 
intended benefit (in this case, accolades for the employee inventor). Even with a delay, the two 
reinforcing loops form a zero-sum game (Wolstenholme, 2003).  Moving to win-win requires an 
outside intervention (shown via the dotted, third balancing loop between invention disclosure 
and regulatory action): for example, by developing less stringent disclosure restrictions for 
academe. 
 
The key danger uncovered by this archetype relates to secrecy.  Notional system 
dynamics in Figure 3 show how the climate of secrecy at an enterprise increases over time. 
Simultaneously, disclosures among stakeholders decrease.  Increased secrecy leads to an 
increasing number of patents without appeals since minimal doubt exists among possible 
competitors and patent challengers about prior publication or disclosure. This result reinforces 
the importance of secrecy: as it receives more attention, collaboration, exchange, and educational 
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efforts receive less.  The vicious circle continues with a lasting impact on the innovative climate, 
especially risk taking.  Secrecy becomes the watchword, repeatedly, in new product 
development, especially for emerging technologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSERT Figure 3.  Mitigating risk with Prior Art facilitated by a Relative Achievement 
 
Archetype 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yet, an enterprise must avoid a blind pursuit of secrecy.  Calderini, Franzoni and Vezzulli 
(2009) found that with less harsh regimes of secrecy, benefits accrue to all involved because the 
feedback from applied research is richer: as is likely the case with engineering.  They suggest 
that policies regarding intellectual property rights should be refined and tailored to field 
specificities.  Along similar lines, Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) found that the protection 
offered by both secrecy and patents is higher for all chemicals than other products. 
 
Secrecy results in another unintended consequence, recongesting, that forces 
entrepreneurs to track what could become ubiquitous non-disclosure agreements clogging the 
new product development process.  Similarly, Thursby and Kemp (2002) found that the 
incentives set by internal university policies were effective in driving a larger number of 
disclosures about inventions to local technology transfer offices, producing more patents issued 
and licensed by universities (Calderini, Franzoni, & Vezzulli, 2009, p. 16]. Together, these 
possibilities highlight the need to develop protocols to handle any disclosures about a possible 
patentable idea, as well as the scheduling of introductions of innovative goods and services to the 
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market. 
 
 
Post-Grant Review (PGR) 
 
 
As a last look at the unintended consequences of AIA, consider the added transparency 
aimed at avoiding litigation over patents: post-grant review.  This change ideally leads to 
improved cost-effectiveness: allowing a defense against infringement claims by giving anyone a 
grace period of nine months to review a patent’s validity, without having to go to court and by 
relying on only the preponderance of the evidence.  This opens the door for a reverse revenge 
effect (Tenner, 1996): the costs associated with defending a claim through PGR are likely to be 
substantially lower versus litigation, likely reducing the current practice of settling even non- 
meritorious claims. On the other hand, with a lowered standard of evidence, more opposition to a 
patent is to be expected. With respect to the total cost of defending a patent, AIA may be a wash: 
a patent owner may benefit from the lower per-claim cost of the new administrative procedures, 
but suffer from an ever-increasing number of claims.  Regardless, prudence demands a sinking 
fund to defend a patent. 
 
This transparency (a rearranging unintended consequence) is encapsulated in the classic, 
shifting the burden archetype, an out of control generic system archetype (recall Table 2), with 
both a balancing loop and a reinforcing loop. 
 
 
 
 
 
INSERT Figure 4.  Mitigating risk with Post Grant Review facilitated by an Out-of-Control 
 
Archetype 
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Figure 4 shows that intensive legal review of a patent application is designed to minimize 
the challenges from patent trolls.  Yet, the reinforcing loop (even more legal review) created by 
the reaction of others in the enterprise (as a consequence of the control action itself, rather than 
the outcome, per se), results in the unintended consequence of a loss of focus on the value 
proposition of the technology, the innovation.  The solution link introduces a needed second 
balancing loop to recapture the ideal of providing a compelling value proposition for the 
technology, and reducing the threat of patent challenges. 
 
The notional system dynamics highlight the danger of moving the focus away from a 
value proposition to legal nuance.  The emphasis on intensive legal review may actually increase 
patent challenges arising from weak value propositions, while simultaneously leading to an 
unintended exchange of resources between the legal and R&D departments: only a temporary 
fix, at best.  Lin, Chen and Wu (2006) note the inherent danger in this unintended exchange:  a 
firm’s technology portfolio has strategic importance, particularly its patent diversity, and 
correlates with a firm’s performance (profitability and shareholder value).  The enterprise may 
handle the patent challenges in short term via more legal review, but the fundamental problem is 
unsolved; hence, it will reoccur (Braun, 2002). 
 
Innovators and entrepreneurs must expect more lawsuits given the high reward that a 
protest during PGR may garner: this possible reward encourages not only justifiable claims, but 
also patent trolls. Enterprises can react to this problem in two ways: covering the symptoms or 
finding fundamental solutions. The symptomatic solution to this problem is to hire more legal 
staff to handle the challenges, whereas the fundamental solution is to focus more on the 
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innovation’s novelty and utility, especially by crafting a unique value proposition for the 
technology that makes it difficult to challenge.  Ernst, Conley and Omland (2016) imply that 
successful enterprises will choose the latter to create value from patents. 
 
Other, Complex Questions of Interest 
Beyond these rather straightforward conversations about first-to-file, best mode, prior art, and 
post-grant review, systems thinking (incorporating generic archetypes) can be used to enrich the 
communication about other complex questions and scenarios linked to changes wrought by AIA. 
To illustrate, consider three scenarios, progressing from simpler to more complex (in terms of 
numbers and types of research questions and archetypes involved, as well as number of stakeholder 
perspectives considered):   
(1) A small startup wants to gain insight into how the requirements for Prior Art might affect 
the strategy regarding when to file for patent protection and whether or not to use a 
provisional application.  It uses a single archetype, Escalation, and interprets outcomes 
(consequences) from only its own perspective. 
(2) A large, high-technology firm with thousands of patents in electronics wants to investigate 
how Best Mode Disclosure might affect its strategy regarding the number of patents to file, 
when to file, as well as the appropriate communication mode for establishing claims of 
Prior Art.  It uses two archetypes, Limits to Growth and Successful to Successful, to assess 
these consequences, all from its own perspective. 
(3) The Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) wants to perform a large-
scale study of how Prior Art and Best Mode Disclosure requirements may affect member 
universities’ strategies for determining their own number of patent applications, when to 
file, types and number of claims per patent application, and likelihood of patent 
infringement suits arising from consciously minimizing Best Mode Disclosure. It uses one 
archetype, Accidental Adversaries, and interprets its outcomes from not only its own 
perspective, but also another stakeholder group—the potential licensees of the patents 
derived from university research (for example, Saint Louis University, 2009).  
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Working with AIA 
 
 
Without reflection, we go blindly on our way, creating more 
unintended consequences, and failing to achieve anything useful. 
Margaret Wheatley 
 
 
 
All in all, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act not only represents an attempt to improve 
the patent lifecycle, but also signals a need for an expanded and more diverse skill set for all IP 
stakeholders.  Figure 5 summarizes eight key unintended consequences that drive this need. 
Political, economic, social, and technological dimensions define the issues.  Collectively, Figure 
5 suggests that every stakeholder will remain mindful of all options to protect intellectual 
property and will allocate resources wisely.  All will be prepared for more challenges to patents, 
via both litigation and administrative procedure.  All will develop caution regarding grace 
periods and prior art; becoming wary of unintended disclosure over emerging social media or 
via alliances.  When the conversation relates to innovation, intellectual property, and technology 
portfolios, innovators will re-engineer protocols to help guard against risks. 
 
 
INSERT Figure 5.  Unintended Consequences of AIA have systemic impacts in the Political, 
 
Economic, Social, and Technical spheres for IP Stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
 
No doubt AIA also affects the decisions and behaviors of all stakeholder groups involved 
in technology development and commercialization. Consider the lone wolf inventor tinkering in a 
home garage, or a corporate scientist working in a Federal Laboratory, or a crowd-sourced 
invention, or allies working to develop an emerging technology [see Schubert (2016) for how 
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innovation partnerships may increase the risks of IP infringement], or myriad, other possible 
collaborative arrangements.  Irrespective of the genesis of the innovation or invention, efforts to 
protect intellectual property must consider the changes wrought by AIA. 
 
 
 
 
 
No stakeholders in the patent bargain will be able to escape the pervasive effects of the 
AIA on their organization and operations. This essay serves as a primer aimed at improving the 
strategic communication among all parties about the changing complexities of IP and patent law. 
While not a substitute for ongoing legal counsel, it offers a systemic view of key changes 
embodied in AIA. It highlights changes in each of four major areas (first-to-file, best mode 
disclosure, expansion of prior art, and post-grant review). Further, it identifies risks that might 
flow from these changes.  Systems thinking, exemplified by causal loops and generic archetypes, 
underscores these risks while enabling key stakeholders to communicate better about the 
protocols needed to mitigate the hidden dangers.  Looking ahead, applying systems thinking 
appears instrumental to former USPTO Director Lee’s desire for a better patent system: it allows 
for holistic communication (Quinn, 2016). 
 
In summary, AIA has laudable goals, but it translates into added concerns for innovators 
and entrepreneurs.   The changes bring added responsibilities.  AIA may hinder outreach among 
corporations and universities (via the cautions in information exchange based on the extension 
of prior art).  AIA, even though it offers possible cost reductions for patent filings and fees, 
offers greater advantages to larger enterprises that have the resources to devote to integrating a 
comprehensive and sophisticated evaluation protocol for potential patents within the overall 
framework of new product development.  Most worrisome for society, AIA may change the 
focus of innovation from breakthrough innovation to incremental improvements. 
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Figure 1.  Mitigating risk with First-to-File facilitated by an Underachievement Archetype 
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Figure. 2.  Mitigating risk with Best Mode facilitated by a Relative Control Archetype 
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Figure 3.  Mitigating risk with Prior Art facilitated by a Relative Achievement Archetype 
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Figure 4.  Mitigating risk with Post Grant Review facilitated by an Out-of-Control Archetype 
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Figure 5.  Unintended Consequences of AIA have systemic impacts in the Political, Economic, Social, and 
Technical spheres for IP Stakeholder 
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 Public Interest Statement 
 This essay informs the myriad stakeholders who are responsible for protecting intellectual property (IP)    
innovators, entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers, marketers and attorneys.  We clarify four important changes to 
the US patent system as a consequence of the implementation of the Leahy-Smith American Invents Act (AIA): 
being first-to-file for protection; eliminating best mode disclosure; a more expansive view of prior art; and post-
grant review. Understanding the implications of these changes will reduce stakeholder missteps that could not 
only jeopardize patent approval (for example, disclosing an invention publically before filing a patent 
application), but also negatively impact the product portfolio of an enterprise, as well as its competiveness in the 
market ecosystem.  We apply systems thinking and generic archetypes to highlight ways to mitigate key 
unintended consequences of AIA on IP stakeholders, and highlight possible systemic impacts in economic, 
social, political, and technological spheres (for example, shifting innovation from breakthrough to incremental 
improvements).   
